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A Stiff Man-Child Walking: Derrida’s
Economy of Secrecy and Faulkner’s
“Barn Burning”
Michael Wainwright
Aye—no. No—aye, for I must be nothing,
Therefore no “no,” for I resign to thee.
Now, mark me how I will undo myself.
William Shakespeare, King Richard II, 4.1.200–02.
Not that it really does connect and yet not that it
really does not.
Gertrude Stein, “What is English Literature,” 17.
1 In Given Time (1992), Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) not only discusses the socioeconomic
prescience  of  Charles  Baudelaire’s  (1821–1867)  “La  fausse  monnaie”  (1869),  but  also
anticipates his own thoughts in On the Name (1995) concerning the economy of secrecy.
Retrospectively applying these economic contemplations to Baudelaire’s prose poem—an
exercise that Derrida does not undertake—both invests in the speculation engendered by
“La  fausse  monnaie”  and  recommends  that  retrospective  application  to  works  with
comparable  avant-la-lettre tendencies,  such  as  William  Faulkner’s  (1897–1962)  “Barn
Burning”  (1938).  Both  texts  exhibit  what  Richard  Rorty  would  call  a  poststructural
“lubriciousness  of  the  tangled”  (126),  but  while  a  Derridean  analysis  of  “La  fausse
monnaie”  identifies  the  surrender  of  authorial  control  behind  this  complex
indeterminacy, a similar examination emphasizes the failure of Faulknerians to recognize
the  same  form  of  acquiescence  in  “Barn  Burning.”  This  inability  undermines  their
laudable attempts to reveal the liberal politics of Faulkner’s text. By examining Derrida’s
economy of secrecy, the following essay traces this critical failure, reappraises Faulkner’s
canonical short story, and redresses the interpretive balance in his favor.
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2 The inviolable (or absolute) secret connotes an open rather than a hidden truth, explains
Derrida in On the Name, and is therefore a paradoxical secret without secret. This obvious
enigma fills the reader with desire:
When  all  hypotheses  are  permitted,  groundless  and  ad  infinitum,  about  the
meaning of a text, or the final intentions of an author, whose person is no more
represented than nonrepresented by a character or by a narrator, by a poetic friend
or  fictional  sentence,  which  detaches  itself  from  its  presumed  source  and  thus
remains locked way [au secret], when there is no longer even any sense in making
decisions about some secret behind the surface of a textual manifestation (and it is
this situation which I would call text or trace), when it is the call [appel] of this
secret, … which points back to the other or to something else, when it is this itself
which  keeps  our  passion  aroused,  and  holds  us  to  the  other,  then  the  secret
impassions us. (29)
3 The  absolute  secret,  like  an  unbreakable  code,  encourages  endless  hypotheses  of
impassioned interpretation. Literary worth is the open secret of absolute secrecy allied to
and against which the revealable (or conditional) secret inscribes a marked contrast.
4 The  relationship  between  what  is  inviolable  and  what  is  revealable  has  political
ramifications  for  Derrida.  Absolute  secrecy  arises  from  a  reserve  of  unfathomable
information,  while  conditional  secrecy  depends  on  a  store  of  potential  knowledge.
Proprietorship of a revealable secret privileges its owner with “a phantasmatic power
over others” (30) and this surplus potential can support interpersonal structures of an
undemocratic nature. Inviolable secrecy, however, as its openness suggests, cannot fall
foul of individual speculation, and this economic neutrality makes literature a democratic
form of expression. “Through its aporetic structure,” writes Alex Segal, absolute secrecy
“displaces  the  use  of  (conditional)  secrecy  to  attain  power  and  is  thereby  tied  to
democracy” (190).
5 The  aporia  of  the  inviolable  secret,  which  connotes  the  gap  between  the  actually
communicated and the intended but inexpressible communication,  separates a writer
from his work. An author cannot decrypt the absolute mysteries of his texts anymore
than a reader of those texts can. Hence, as Nils Clausson observes,
one of the consequences of poststructuralist theories of language and textuality has
been to render problematical the commonsense idea that the author’s intentions
are a wholly reliable guide either to recovering the true meaning of a text, what the
writer supposedly put there, or to correcting misinterpretations of a text, readings
wrongly read into a text by errant or arrant readers. (109)
6 Breaking with the power of mastery, the inviolable secret is a form of literary gift, where
gifting implies benevolence without return. Literature is an absolutely secret donation
that thanks or another form of payment cannot recognize. Essential affinity between the
aporetic essences of literature and the gift both identifies a literary work with and frees
that work from its author. “Suppose that X, something or someone (a trace, a work, an
institution, a child), bears your name, that is to say, your title,” posits Derrida in On the
Name. “The naïve rendering or common illusion [fantasme courant] is that you have given
your name to X, thus all that returns to X, in a direct or indirect way, in a straight or
oblique line, returns to you, as a profit for your narcissism. But,” cautions Derrida, 
as you are not your name, nor your title, and given that, as the name or title, X does
very  well  without  you  or  your  life,  that  is,  without  the  place  toward  which
something could return—just as that is  the definition and the very possibility of
every trace, and of all names and all titles, so your narcissism is frustrated a priori
by that from which it profits or hopes to profit. Conversely, suppose that X did not
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want your name or your title; suppose that, for one reason or another, X broke free
from it  and chose himself  another name,  working a kind of  repeated severance
from the originary severance; then your narcissism, doubly injured, will find itself
all the more enriched precisely on account of this: that which bears, has borne, will
bear your name seems sufficiently free, powerful, creative, and autonomous to live
alone and radically to do without you and your name. (12–13)
7 This converse supposition implies that “the ability to disappear in your name” is what
“returns to your name.” The absolute secrecy that frees a text from its authorial seal is at
the same time the condition that augments the authorial self (or auctoritas). “In the two
cases of this same divided passion,” states Derrida,  “it  is impossible to dissociate the
greatest profit and the greatest privation” (13).
8 Literature  can  survive  without  authorship—indeed,  the  unattributed  work  of
logographers (or ghost writers)  and the secrecy of  anonymous authors (attributed to
“anon”)  instantiate the durability  of  autonomous texts—but although the author can
disappear into the inviolable privacy of literary ownership, the greater the autonomy of a
text, the greater the possibility of intentionality behind that break from creative purpose.
“For  Derrida,”  as  Segal  stresses,  “attention  to  authorial  intention  is  a  fundamental
guardrail in the interpretation of texts” (191). The relationship opened between text and
author by absolute secrecy, which allies the aporetic structures of literature and the gift,
exhibits paradoxical degrees of authorial responsibility.
9 At one extreme, authorship is an irresponsible activity; the inviolable secrets of literature
leave the field of expression open. In this regard, argues Derrida in On the Name, secrecy
ties the destiny of literature “to a certain noncensure, to the space of democratic freedom
(freedom of the press, freedom of speech, etc.)” (28). From this perspective, as Derrida
contends in “Before the Law” (1991), the literary domain “is not only that of an instituted
fiction but also a fictive institution which in principle allows one to say everything.” To say
all is “to totalize by formalizing, but to say everything is also to break out of [franchir]
prohibitions. To affranchise oneself [s’affranchir]—in every field where law can lay down the
law” (36).
10 At the other extreme, authorship is a responsible activity; the propositional nature of a
work is  an authorial  duty.  Unscrupulous literature,  whether perfunctorily  penned or
knowingly produced, can spread unethical or politically fallacious messages through the
accepted protocols of semiotics and the traditional meanings of (Saussurean) signs. Thus,
the Derridean focus on authorial intention, as Segal insists, “no more consigns literary
interpretation to unbridled subjectivism and pure arbitrariness than it severs literature
from ethical or political accountability” (206 n5).
11 Literature  is  at  once  the  complete  responsibility  of  an author  and an appeal  to  the
democratic spirit. Although usually a singular creation of an individual, which no one can
gainsay,  and  therefore  a  secret  matter  of  inviolable  control,  a  literary  creation
nevertheless leaves the propositional intent of that absolute accountability open to public
scrutiny.  “Responsibility  must  be  infinite.  That’s  why  I  always  feel  not  responsible
enough” (48–49), admits Derrida in “following theory” (2003),
because I’m finite and because there are an infinite number of others to whom or
for  whom  or  from  whom  I  should  be  responsible.  I’m  always  not  responsible
enough, and responsibility is infinite or it is not, but I cannot be responsible to some
extent in the strict sense of “responsibility.” (49)
12 That  is  why,  he  maintains,  “I  always  feel  guilty”  (49).  The  double  bind  of  textual
accountability, as pursued by Derrida in “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism”
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(1996), can thereby challenge the standard yet ironic concept of “politics and democracy
as openness—where all are equal and where the public realm is open to all—which tends
to deny, efface or prohibit the secret” (80).
13 After a typically elliptical introduction, as though the boundaries of Given Time testify to
the  related  works  that  lie  beyond  its  margins,  Derrida  approaches  the  textual
accountability of Baudelaire’s prose poem from its title. “The referential structure of a
title,”  admits  Derrida,  “is  always  very  tricky”  (84)—and  “La  fausse  monnaie”  is  no
exception. On the one hand, this heading refers to the phenomenon of counterfeit money,
“a sign without value, if not without meaning.” On the other hand, this heading refers to
the subsequent narrative, “this text here, this story of counterfeit money” (85). “The title
of a text,” observes Segal, “would seem to be connected to its demarcation, its identity.
Yet Derrida argues that in so far as counterfeit money is illegal, the title of ‘Counterfeit
Money’ is without title” (194). Ordinarily, an introductory heading both identifies and
begins a text,  but according to Derrida’s thesis in “Before the Law,” “the power and
import of a title have an essential relationship with something like the law” (188–89). The
illegality of forged currency means that “La fausse monnaie” is without a valid heading.
“Barn  Burning,”  as  the  title  of  Faulkner’s  short  story,  which  refers  at  once  to  a
transgressive activity and the narrative that follows, engenders a similar dehiscence. A
reference to an illegal act, and so courting a break with lawful power, “Barn Burning” is
another title without title.1
14 Opening from its titular framework to reveal two friends emerging from another frame,
the door of a tobacconist’s shop in Paris, Baudelaire’s prose poem immediately arouses
speculation with the behavior of the narrator’s colleague. “As we were walking from a
tobacconist’s,” recalls the narrator, “my friend carefully sorted out his change: into the
left pocket of his waistcoat he slipped the small gold coins, into the right, the small silver
coins; into the left pocket of his breeches, a mass of large copper coins, and finally, into
the right, a two-franc silver piece he had examined with noticeable attention” (48–49).2
The two men shortly encountered “a beggar who tremblingly held out his hat to us.” Each
man handed over a coin. “My friend’s offering,” concedes the narrator, “was much larger
than mine.” Embarrassed, he pointed out this discrepancy to his colleague, but his friend
dismissed the issue nonchalantly: “it was the counterfeit coin” (49). This rejoinder about
the silver piece that had caught his colleague’s attention only minutes earlier perplexes
the narrator. Moreover, as Derrida explains of another structuring device, “the narration
is framed in such a way that, like the narrator, we are the friend’s debtors, but to the
paradoxical extent that we live on the very credit we are obliged to extend to him. Whether
or not we take him at his word,” continues Derrida, “we have only his word. We are at
once his debtor and his creditor” (151). The reader partakes of the narrator’s viewpoint
and must ask, as the narrator does, why his colleague made his admission about the silver
coin.  Credence,  as  a  matter  of  speculation,  and  credit,  as  the  issue  of  acclaim,  are
suddenly at stake.
15 “Here,” argues Derrida in Given Time, “we can speculate and extend credit: at least three
hypotheses, but in fact a series of innumerable prognostications” (149), arise. According
to one premise, as the narrator first believes, his colleague has lied “to justify his own
largesse” in donating an amount that “might serve as the germ for several day’s capital,
in the hands of a poor, small-time speculator” (49). Putting this reasoning another way,
his friend is not only modest, but is also sensitive to the narrator’s self-reflective qualms
concerning his own meanness. Into the narrator’s “miserable brain” (49), however, comes
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another thought. Did his colleague merely wish to enjoy the possible consequences of
giving  a  mendicant  counterfeit  money?  The  man might  not  recognize  the  coin  as  a
forgery and be arrested when trying to spend it. Alternatively, the next recipient of the
coin might not recognize it  as counterfeit  and the beggar might prosper.  Just as the
narrator reaches this seemingly unjust conclusion about his friend’s motive, his colleague
“brusquely breaks into his reverie,” repeating the narrator’s contention. “Yes, you are
right,” he confesses, “there is no sweeter pleasure than surprising a man by giving him
more  than  his  hopes  allowed”  (50).  In  the  light  of  this  admittance,  the  colleague’s
declaration signifies what Derrida calls “a surplus of naïve triumph and boastfulness close
to cynicism”;  as a corollary,  the narrator’s friend has gratuitously accredited himself
through secretive reckoning, which for Derrida amounts to this:
So, you recognize how good I am at treating myself to the greatest pleasure; well, I
am even sharper than that:  I  bought myself  the greatest  pleasure at  the lowest
price: you give me credit, but I speculate even better than you think. (149)
16 Crucially, these two conjectures, the first concerning self-effacing altruism, the second
concerning  self-interested  arrogance,  exhibit  a  relationship  that  classical  dialectics
cannot resolve; “on the contrary,” as Derrida expounds, “they superimpose themselves
on each other, they accumulate like a capital of true or (perhaps) counterfeit money that
may produce interest; they overdetermine each other in the ellipsis of the declaration.”
Each conjecture “is justifiable and each has a certain right to be credited, accredited.
This,” he concludes, “is the phenomenon without phenomenality of counterfeit money”
(149)—and the third of Derrida’s immediate prognostications.
17 In “Barn Burning,” the unnamed, heterodiegetic, and inviolably secret narrator begins his
tale by introducing both “the Justice of the Peace’s court” and the seemingly inconsistent
detail that this room “smelled of cheese” (3). Due lawful process has in fact seconded a
general store. Colonel Sartoris (or Sarty) Snopes’s growing awareness of his surroundings,
his father’s (Abner’s) appearance before the justice, and the notion that Sarty is both
young enough and too  young to  be  the  bearer  of  an  important  conditional  secret—
privileged knowledge that his father and elder brother might also hold—slowly announce
themselves as significant narratological details within this peculiar ambiance of law, law
enforcement, and the economics of exchange.
18 Mr. Harris, a local landowner, recounts the events concerning his tenant Abner Snopes
that culminated in these proceedings. Snopes’s “hog got into my corn,” he tells the court.
“I caught it up and sent it back to him. He had no fence that would hold it. I told him so,
warned him. The next time I put the hog in my pen. When he came to get it,” recounts
Harris, “I gave him enough wire to patch up his pen. The next time I put the hog up and
kept it. I rode down to his house and saw the wire I gave him still rolled on to the spool in
his yard,” maintains Snopes’s landlord. “I told him he could have the hog when he paid
me a dollar pound fee (3–4). That evening, continues Harris, “a strange nigger” (4) came
to collect Snopes’s pig. Having paid the fine, and with the pig in tow, this intermediary
then delivered a message: “He say to tell you wood and hay kin burn.” Rather at a loss,
Harris  asked  the  African  American  to  repeat  himself,  but  the  tenor  of  the  message
remained the same. “That whut he say to tell you,” the man replied. “Wood and hay kin
burn” (4).
19 The transitive relations that marked this communication—the human links in its chain—
simultaneously indict Abner for and absolve him from responsibility for the message.
Harris being the origin of this evidence, rather than the unknown messenger, further
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weakens its legitimacy before the law. The justice’s repeated call to produce the African
American in person testifies to this flaw in Harris’s suit against Snopes. Be that as it may,
attests Harris, “that night my barn burned. I got the stock out but I lost the barn” (4).
20 From Harris’s point of view, Snopes has slaked his annoyance through the impropriety of
barn burning, an act of dissent he hopes to cloud in conditional secrecy, but without
further personal evidence to offer the court, Harris must produce another witness. He
knows Snopes’s eldest son will be as secretive before the court as his father is, so he calls
Sarty  to  testify.  Harris  hopes  Sarty  is  still  innocent  enough  to  reveal  his  father’s
conditional  secret  in  the  name  of  truth.  Sarty,  however,  says  nothing  other  than
whispering his full name. Faced with a silent minor in his court, the justice asks Harris
incredulously, “Do you want me to question this boy?” Harris’s conflict of responsibilities
to the law, which he recognizes with a “violently, explosively” stated acquiescence to the
justice’s implicit expectation, falls in Abner Snopes’s favor. With no independent witness,
the justice dismisses the case against Snopes, but nevertheless orders him to take his
“wagon and get out of this country before dark” (5). The expectancy induced by the title
of  Faulkner’s  story is  maintained and the reader  is  free  to  speculate  whether  “Barn
Burning” will reveal the currently inviolable secret about the cause of Harris’s fire, which
(in the case of a criminal act) the perpetrator would hold in conditional secrecy.
21 Thus, as with “La fausse monnaie,” a supposedly revealable secret empowers its holder in
“Barn  Burning.”  Furthermore,  as  with  Baudelaire’s  prose  poem,  the  narrative  frame
leaves Faulkner’s reader paradoxically indebted to the African-American messenger. At
once this man’s debtor and creditor, was Harris (and, in turn, the reader) to have taken
the  relayed  message  as  a  warning  or  as  an  expression  of  inevitable  intention?  The
reserves  of  deconstructive  energy,  the  secretive  traces  interwoven  throughout  the
surface textuality of “Barn Burning,” not only pose this question, but also imply that,
whatever the answer, the message from this stranger is a curious form of gift.
22 The  intelligent  and  contradictory  readings  and  writings  unraveled  and  spun  by
Faulknerians in response to “Barn Burning” acknowledge and draw on this paradoxical
resource with the hypothesis  that  Abner is  unlikely to send an African American on
Snopes  business  and  the  inferable  consequences  of  this  improbable  event  regarding
Abner’s racial lineage. The work of John Duvall provides an apposite entrance into these
discussions.  “As  [Richard]  Godden  has  pointed  out,”  and  as  Duvall  appreciates,
“everything about Abner is associated with blackness—his black hat and frockcoat, but
most particularly his relationship with fire. Faulkner’s repeated use of the term ‘niggard’
to describe the fire that Abner burns for his family,” notes Duvall, “serves as wordplay
that both points toward, even as its etymological difference deflects attention away from,
‘nigger’” (115). Duvall, however, takes Godden’s argument further. “I wish to suggest that
the story’s ‘strange nigger,’” he writes,
is actually in the store where the hearing takes place and is the very figure of the
man in black, Abner Snopes. Since almost the only person Abner would trust with a
dollar is himself (or closekin), it seems plausible that Abner (or perhaps his eldest
son) blackened up in order to collect his hog and deliver his warning in person
without being recognized. (115)
23 Duvall immediately acknowledges “one logical and one textual” weakness to his proposal
of a blacked up Abner. “An immediate objection,” he admits, “might be that surely Harris
would recognize such a ruse and would be immediately able to distinguish an artificial
from an authentic black.” Duvall paraphrases the relevant section of Eric Lott’s Love and
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Theft (1993) to answer this point. “Audiences of minstrel shows in the nineteenth century
often were completely fooled by the racial masquerade,” states Duvall, “and assumed that
the white performers who entertained them were actually black” (115). The text-based
objection submits that Sarty’s plea when Abner intends to burn his next employer’s barn
—“‘Ain’t you going to even send a nigger?’ he cried. ‘At least you sent a nigger before”’
(21)—undercuts Duvall’s conjecture. In response, Duvall contends that “the detail of the
black  man carrying  a  warning  is  one  Sarty  more  likely  learned about  from Harris’s
testimony” (115–16). Abner’s youngest boy “effectively knows no more about the identity
of the ‘strange’ black than the reader”; his question “in no way proves that he had first-
hand knowledge about his father actually sending a racially black messenger to Harris”
(116).
24 Nonetheless,  and perhaps because the cultural  mediation of  race is  his  focus,  Duvall
misses the logical and textual objection to his thesis, the obvious reason why a blackface
Abner would not have fooled Harris: that something other, that sign divorced from race,
that Achilles’ heel in terms of mimicry; namely, Abner’s “stiff and ruthless limp” (8). That
his secretive eldest son—presumably the Flem of Faulkner’s subsequent fiction, but on the
evidence of “Barn Burning” the absolutely secret scion who goes unnamed, while the
younger Colonel Sartoris causes consternation among Mississippians aware of the Civil
War  provenance  associated  with  this  name—is  the  only  candidate  for  the  unknown
African American other than an unknown African American. The absolute secrecy of
appellative anonymity qualifies Abner’s firstborn son for the role of Duvall’s messenger.
25 Even so, from the perspective of deconstructive potential within the text, whether the
messenger is  Abner or  not  is  less  relevant  than both Godden and Duvall’s  laudatory
efforts in identifying the language and metaphors that stand in almost secret contrast to
the ostensible  meaning of  “Barn Burning.”  These  critical  exertions  do not  allow the
explicit, central, and dominant implications of the text to drive their critical readings and
writings. In racial terms, according to the spectrum of responses from this scholarship,
Abner might be white, black passing (intentionally or not) for white, white artificially
made up to be black, or black passing (intentionally or not) for white artificially passing
for black. The preeminent inference from these interpretations evinces Faulkner’s gift of
ethical potential in “Barn Burning.” Cynics might rate this contention as academically
gratuitous but, as Derrida argues in“following theory,” there is no law restricting the
limits of carefully considered criticism. “There are ethics,” he avers, “precisely because
there is  this  contradiction,  because there is no rule” (31)  to  reading literature.  That
Faulkner’s short story subversively blurs the sociopolitical boundaries, distinctions that it
purportedly and simultaneously clearly supports, promotes “Barn Burning” as a worthy
ethical  resource.  Faulkner’s  propositional  intention is  the firm historicization of  this
short story within the ostensible setting of the 1890s but as implicitly questioned from
the late 1930s.
26 Literary critics have often underestimated historically as well as politically this type of
chronotopic superimposition. The debate concerning countercultural hope in the face of
reactionary cultural standards remains a priority for postcolonial literary criticism and
Derridean musings about secrecy and literature can positively contribute to this aspect of
Faulkner studies; for, as Clausson insists, “if we are going to follow Fredric Jameson’s
injunction  to  ‘always  historicize,’”  then “we  must  first,  as  [Herman]  Rapaport  has
insisted, read ‘with the kind of dedication to reading that has not been in evidence in the
history that could been called the eclipsing of deconstruction’” (125). Clausson shares
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with Rapaport, whose careful reassessment of poststructuralism in The Theory Mess (2001)
is Clausson’s principal corroborative resource, a practical goal. According to Clausson,
their common aim concerns
what deconstruction can offer to the practice of literary studies at a juncture when
the turn to history and culture, in the varied forms of new historicism, Marxism,
and cultural,  gender, post-colonial,  ethnic,  race  and queer  studies,  has  had  the
unfortunate (and not always unintended) consequence of framing the practice of
literary studies as an either/or proposition. (108)
27 This frame is “either a cultural/historical criticism of political engagement with issues of
race, gender and ethnicity, or an apolitical retreat into hermetic formalism, with a focus
on the text itself and on aesthetics” (108). Deconstruction does not denote a “negative
demonstration that the binaries ‘cancel’ out one another in a bottomless pit of meanings
endlessly  deferred,”  stresses  Clausson,  because  “the  next  step  is  to  ask:  Why  these 
particular binaries? and Why these binaries in this particular historical context?” (124).
This approach heeds Derrida’s advice in Writing and Difference (1967): once the limit of a
binary  opposition  “makes  itself  felt,”  the  critic  must  “question  systematically  and
rigorously the history” (358) of the signs and concepts constituting that delimitation.
28 If  sterilization does  not  result  from this  poststructuralist  “action”  (358)—if,  in  other
words, the impasse inherent to texts constructed from blatant oppositions, such as in the
racist or misogynistic tract, does not materialize—then these binaries must be thoroughly
analyzed. These two steps, as followed by Toni Morrison in Playing in the Dark (1992) and
Susan  Gubar  in  Racechanges (1997),  provide  more  contemplative  grist  to  Duvall’s
interpretation of “Barn Burning.” Specifically, Morrison’s work on figurative blackness
and Africanist presence in the canonical literature of white writers and Gubar’s study of
racial metamorphosis in art inform Duvall’s thoughts about artificially passing for black.
Yet,  while these critical  sources show how “artists  from widely divergent ideological
backgrounds…meditate on racial privilege and privation as well as on the disequilibrium
of race,” Duvall does “see limitations to their projects inasmuch as they always identify
white writers’ engagements with blackness as a problem or a failure.” On the one hand,
“Morrison typically identifies a failure in aesthetic design” (106).  On the other hand,
Gubar judges “every white appropriation of blackness” to “be a net loss in the search for a
more ethical  understanding of  race” (106–07). Duvall  sympathizes with each of  these
views,  but  believes  “they  may  be  only  half  right,  because  there  is  also  something
potentially productive in such appropriations.” Crucially, as Faulkner’s literature so often
connotes, “there are in-between characters” (107), whom the endeavors of Morrison and
Gubar  necessarily  leave  hidden  in  the  secretive  Faulknerian  shadows.  Particularly
appropriate to Duvall’s cause are Faulkner’s “Caucasians who instantiate blackness in
ways that complicate the Southern racial binarism. These presumptively white characters
come to embody black culture,” he argues, “where ‘black’ is not exactly race any longer,
but (because it is the South) it is not exactly not race either” (107).
29 Indeed, Duvall implicitly identifies the first two steps of Derridean problematization from
Writing and Difference in Gubar’s thesis,  but implicitly censures her conclusions as the
opening of other binaries (or dialectical opposites) that provide the literary critic with
little exploratory scope. “Despite Gubar’s attempts to work dialectically,” regrets Duvall,
“in the last instance her recurring conclusion is that black impersonations of whiteness
are, if  not always politically useful,  at least justifiable,  while white impersonations of
blackness are inevitably gestures of bad faith” (107 n1). In contrast, Duvall wishes to show
how “Faulkner’s use of figurative blackness is literally productive because it allows him a
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way to map imbricated relations between one form of otherness (racial) and other forms
of otherness (gender/sexuality and class). More importantly,” maintains Duvall, “it allows
Faulkner’s readers to see that,  whatever the residual  racism of William Faulkner,  his
narratives negotiate racial  struggle even when race seems absent  from their  field of
vision;  these narratives are,  in other words,” he concludes,  “racialized in a way that
enables a critical purchase on whiteness” (108).
30 Presence through visual absence, of course, accords with the theme of secrecy, and Duvall
recognizes the intersections of minoritarian otherness with majoritarian concepts, but
Derridean thoughts about the secrets of  literature ultimately indict  Duvall’s  criticism
because  he  unintentionally  and  tacitly  accuses  Faulkner  of  authorial  timidity.  “Barn
Burning,”  implies  Duvall,  feints  toward  but  draws  back  from  the  relinquishment  of
auctoritas, a retreat with which Derrida does not charge “La fausse monnaie.” Despite the
less  explicit  manner  in  which  Faulkner  approaches  the  theme  of  secrecy,  Duvall
understands “Barn Burning” to direct the reader to Faulkner’s knowing insertion of an
absolute secret. Unlike this short story, “La fausse monnaie” is a figuration of secrecy that
Baudelaire allows to escape from authorial  control.  In question,  then,  is  the absolute
secrecy  concerning  a  conditional  secret.  For  Duvall,  the  mediation  that  interposes
between Abner Snopes and Harris—who never directly and explicitly exchange words in
“Barn Burning”—is the deferral of Snopes’s communication to a different or “other” voice
so  strange  that  Harris  requires  and  demands  the  repetition  of  that  message.  This
différance, which amounts to an unnecessary supplement to Harris’s repeated testimony
during the courtroom hearing, points to authorial intervention. “Too much of what is not
stated about this  individual  who is  identified as African American doesn’t  quite hold
together,” thinks Duvall. “Is he a stranger or, as the locution seems to suggest, odd or
unusual?” (115). Within the context of “Barn Burning,” Duvall implicitly suggests, the
word “strange” gratuitously exhibits the twofold proprietorship (or split ownership) that
Mikhail Bakhtin attributes to all words prior to individual appropriation. “The word does
not exist in a neutral and impersonal language,” argues Bakhtin in “Discourse in the
Novel” (1934), “but rather it exists in other people’s mouths, in other people’s contexts,
serving other people’s intentions: it is from there that one must take the word, and make
it one’s own” (294).
31 Duvall’s interpretation of this strange locution, of this unusual style of speaking, must be
in part a syntactical response, a critical reaction that places not the justice of the peace
but Faulkner as  the other proprietor of  Harris’s  utterance.  As in poetry,  syntax can,
through repetition or the subtle modulations of reiteration, act as a signifying element in
prose, and the second instance of Harris’s description of the African-American messenger
does display a reiterative alteration. “He was a strange nigger, I tell you,” expostulates
Harris.  The  repetition  of  the  opening  phrase  is  a  syntactical  manipulation  that
emphasizes the importance of the designation “strange,” while the addition of the post-
caesura clause turns Harris’s original declaration into a rhythmically evocative one. To
use musical notation, a three-four time signature breaks Harris’s reiterated statement
into three bars, each of which contains three crochets: “He was a / strange nig-ger / I tell
you.” The attendant beat creates an association between the words “He,” “strange,” and
“I.” This correspondence imposes a strangeness not only to “He,” but also to “I.” Working
together, Harris’s declarations bespeak a syntactical manipulation to Duvall that at once
highlights  the  adjective  “strange”  and  implies  that  the  marshalling  of  the
“He”-“strange”-“I” correspondence comes from an individual other than Harris.  With
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synonyms  for  “strange”  contesting  for  explicit  usage  and  inscribing  that  word  with
ambiguity, adjectival significance within a syntactical context presumably adds to that
multifariously singular content to suggest a propositional attitude on Faulkner’s behalf.
“Strange” is a matter of authorial responsibility, a propositional intervention, and the
strange “I” is Faulkner. The author, implies Duvall, resorts to a gratuitous gift. Faulkner,
as if unwilling to forsake complete responsibility for the secret without secret of absolute
secrecy; cannot help but deny some irresponsibility toward authorship.
32 A  further  extrapolation  from  this  interpretation  of  Duvall’s  criticism  draws  on  the
Derridean  understanding  that  if  an  inviolable  secret  is  to  affirmatively  displace  a
conditional secret, then that dislocation needs no advertisement. In Duvall’s reading of
“Barn  Burning,”  the  authorial  voice  interposes  the  “strange”  epithet  into  Harris’s
testimony and this intervention (or revelatory addition) deflates the impassionate effect
of Faulkner’s text. Duvall certainly does not intend this conclusion. Worse, the absolute
secret that undermines the use of the word “nigger” by Harris,  Abner, and Sarty—an
essentially radical secrecy in the face of unreconstructed views—loses its displacement
value with regard to the conditional secret that empowers Abner’s phantasmatic and
contradictory power to level (however briefly) the hierarchical construct of landlord over
tenant.
33 Recognition of the deconstructive potential within “Barn Burning” for which the author
has  intentional  responsibility,  however,  should  acknowledge  Faulkner’s  concomitant
disavowal of auctoritas. This is where Duvall falls short. Reading Faulkner’s fiction, texts
that  pregnantly  evince  poststructural  tendencies  avant  la  lettre,  encourages  critical
projection beyond and interpolation between the inculcated terms and oppositions of
American culture. In keeping with the aporetic structure of the absolute secret, Abner is
somewhat of the spectral interstice, as Godden’s earlier cited argument should suggest.
The Abner who makes “a small fire, neat, niggard almost” (7), is almost a “nigger,” but
that he learnt this fieldcraft during the American Civil War when “in the woods hiding
from all men, blue or gray” (7), simultaneously places Abner between polar opposites.
Color and the grayscale resulting from a mixture of black and white signify these poles.
This interstitial existence is an implicit strangeness—a different kind of in-between than
Godden and Duvall contemplate. That Abner is a “bloodless” (8) corpse, or “stiff” (4, 5, 8,
etc.),  who is practically always on the move further suggests that Snopes haunts this
intermediate space. Moreover, he can inhabit both extremes of the ontological spectrum
at the same time, as his behavior testifies. Abner is stubborn to his superiors, yet they
deem him a flexible and willing extractor of revenge and avoider of the law. Attire that is
“at once formal and burlesque” (20) is characteristic of these opposites, as is the peculiar
double nature of his physical actions. In leaving Harris’s land after the hearing, Abner
mounts his wagon, sits down, and then strikes his mules “two savage blows with the
peeled willow, but withoutheat.” This action “was not even sadistic; it was exactly that
same quality which in later years would cause his descendants to over-run the engine
before putting a motor car into motion, striking and reining back in the same movement” (6;
emphasis added).
34 Abner’s presence, which always seems to carry two or more interpretations, compounds
his  deconstructive  reserve,  so  that  he  is  both  a  familiar  type  (the  Heimliche)  to  the
communities through which he passes and an unwelcome visitation (the Unheimliche).
Abner is a nonwarrantor whose repeated moves from landlord to landlord facilitate and
symbolize the economic cycle of exchange, but an unusually rebellious one—Karl Marx
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dismissed the political potential or usefulness of the lumpenproletariat—who invariably
reappears  in  the  southern  economy  after  critically  devaluing  his  use-value  to  one
landlord as a persistently irritating revenant within the sociopolitical  environment he
necessarily but unwillingly helps to maintain. At the heart of Abner’s figuration, then, is a
dialogic that constructs and haunts his cultural surroundings with an otherness beyond
the  intention  of  double  inscription.  Any  landlord  is  a  host—Abner’s  necessary  but
despised proprietor—while Abner is that landlord’s accepted guest upon his farmland—a
tenant who always moves before authority can pin him down for malfeasance.  These
visitation rights augment Abner’s (non)authorial self.
35 Duvall’s juxtaposition of Faulkner’s “Barn Burning” with Richard Wright’s “The Man Who
Was Almost a Man” (1940) certainly “underscore[s] the economic slavery experienced
alike by black and white sharecroppers” (113). Nevertheless, while Abner suffers in the
master-slave  dialectic,  he  is  a  radically  ambiguous  participant  in  these  relations,  as
Duvall’s own language unconsciously (and therefore secretly) adumbrates. “The class
lesson that Abner Snopes tries to teach his son Sarty,” professes Duvall,  “is uncannily
similar to the one Dave begins to learn” (114 [emphasis added]) in Wright’s short story.
Abner, as Sarty acknowledges, is substantially insubstantial: he exhibits “that impervious
quality of something cut ruthlessly from tin, depthless, as though, sidewise to the sun, it
would cast no shadow” (10); his presence is that of a “depthless” and “harsh silhouette”
(14);  he  is  both  without  depth  and  of  a  depth  without  bottom.  From  a  capitalist
perspective,  Abner  Snopes  is  one  of  the  insubstantial  men  who  comprise  the
lumpenproletariat, yet he continually speculates on speculation in a manner that costs
his warrantors their ease.3
36 The narrator of Baudelaire’s prose poem, notes Derrida, “speculates on what can happen
to capital in a capital during the age of money, more precisely, in the age of value as
monetary sign” (124). In Faulkner’s short story, the threat of barn burning intervenes
between  the  capitalist  speculation  of  a  series  of  warrantors  and  the  actions  of  a
nonwarrantor supposedly precluded from this kind of speculation. In fact, fire, or going
up in smoke, is crucial to both tales. The events of “La fausse monnaie” arise from the two
men  leaving  a  tobacconist’s  shop,  with  the  narrator’s  colleague  presumably  having
bought some tobacco, and possibly having received a counterfeit coin in the exchange.
Not bothering to complain to the shopkeeper betrays a tendency toward conspicuous
consumption in keeping with what Derrida calls the “pure and luxurious” (Given 107)
gratification afforded by cigarette, cigar, and pipe smoking. Each act is an appropriation
of surplus-value. In contrast, Abner Snopes does not smoke, nor does any member of his
family. This non-habit prefigures Flem Snopes’s behavior in The Hamlet (1940). “Have a
cigar,” landowner Will Varner tells his dirt farmer one day. “I don’t use them” (750), Flem
replies.  “‘Just chew, hah?’  Varner said,” in reference to Flem’s habitually masticating
jaws. “I chew up a nickel now and then until the suption is out of it,” states Flem. “But I
aint never lit a match to one yet” (751).
37 If the speculative thoughts engendered by “La fausse monnaie,” as Derrida argues in Given
Time, “are a guide back to” an “archaic originarity, which we have left behind or allowed
to  become  perverted,  in  a  non-Marxist  socialism”  (66),  then  Baudelaire’s  anti-
mercantilism  finds  an  American  echo  in  Faulkner’s  retrospective  anti-capitalism.
Whereas “La fausse monnaie” concerns the urban economy of bourgeois and mendicant,
“Barn Burning” concerns the rural economy of warrantor and nonwarrantor. Faulkner’s
tale pursues this version of non-Marxist socialism more concertedly than Baudelaire’s
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short prose poem can. The surplus generated when the labor of a dirt farmer in the
American south exceeds subsistence is ceded to the economic upper class. Hence, from
one landowner to the next, Abner Snopes interprets the barn as a symbol of proprietary
excess. A valuable commodity in its own right, the barn stores the surplus crop from
Abner’s  rented land and the other material  possessions (or  “stock”)  of  his  economic
master.  No  wonder  his  threatened  response  is  to  reduce  that  excess  to  ashes.  Barn
burning by a nonwarrantor is a form of conspicuous consumption from a socioeconomic
class  of  people  whose  societal  status  should  ensure  their  preclusion  from  genuine
indulgence. Arson foretells of Abner’s supposed pleasure in taking from his landlord more
than a nonwarrantor’s rights allow. His assumed crimes are interpreted by warrantors as
illegal  expropriations  (rather  than  reductive  reappropriations)  of  surplus-value.
Ostensibly, Abner is a white dirt farmer who rents the land he works, but implicitly he is a
barnburner, the master of a conditional secret that trails behind him as a reserve on
which Abner draws only if slighted by his landlord.
38 The economies of secrecy and capital come markedly to the fore in relation to Snopes’s
next employer, who from Abner’s viewpoint “aims to begin tomorrow owning me body
and soul for the next eight months” (9), when he visits Major de Spain’s mansion for the
first time. “Watching him,” Sarty remarks “the absolutely undeviating course which his
father held,” and cannot help but see “the stiff foot come squarely down in a pile of fresh
droppings where a horse had stood in the drive and which his father could have avoided
by a simple change of stride” (10). Despite a warrantee in the form of Major de Spain’s
servant  trying to  bar  the nonwarrantor’s  entrance to  the mansion,  Abner  tramps in
through the major’s front door. Sarty notices “the prints of the stiff foot on the door
jamb” and watches “them appear on the pale rug behind the machinelike deliberation of
the foot” (11). They leave a track representative of a mutual antagonism that not only
associates  Abner’s  privation  with  the  major’s  conspicuous  consumption,  but  also
prefigures the two men’s relationship. Abner only halts when his presence calls forth the
major’s wife. “Wiping cake or biscuit dough from her hands with a towel”(12)—a sign of
comestible delights to come that Snopes “domesticity” can never have witnessed—she
stares “at the tracks on the blond rug with an expression of incredulous amazement”
(12). The way in which Abner disrupts Major de Spain’s mansion with this simple, curt,
uncompromising visit, the briefest of sojourns in which the “formal and burlesque” (20)
state of his broadcloth coat hovers with the “friction-glazed greenish cast of the bodies of
old house flies” (11) over the horse muck on the French carpet, is that of an annoying
insect that enters and leaves a property according to its own precepts. Snopes’s stiff leg
seems either “to bear (or transmit) twice the weight which the body compassed” (11).
Abner’s contradictory impression is at once a burden to himself and an implicit message
to his new landlord.
39 Abner plans to be both as obvious (or open) and unfathomable (or secretive) for Major de
Spain as he has been for the major’s predecessors. His unaccountable visit to the mansion
is  soon  conflated  in  the  eyes  of  Harris’s  successor  by  the  Snopeses’  successfully
unsuccessful effort to clean the dung-soiled rug. This task, which is communicated to
Abner by a “Negro youth” (12) he does not know—and therefore in an inversion of the
message supposedly transmitted to Harris about barn burning—leaves the carpet in a
different yet similarly damaged state. The original tracks “were gone,” but “where they
had been were now long, water-cloudy scoriations resembling the sporadic course of a
lilliputian mowing machine” (14). In replacing the offensively dark with the offensively
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pale, these new marks follow the course of the old ones. Abner’s presence, which will “not
to  be  dwarfed  by  anything”  (11),  leaves  an  incongruously  Lilliputian  but  potentially
ineradicable trace on the major’s conspicuous possession, which came “all the way from
France” (13) at the cost of “a hundred dollars” (18). The marks on this rug, of course, do
not redress the balance between the tenant and his landlord, as the “pallets” (14) that
separate the sleeping Snopeses from the dirt floor of their rented ex-slave cabin attest;
rather, they would seem to presage the economic retribution of another burning barn.
40 That Abner’s presence succeeds in shaking hierarchical structures is again apparent after
the damaging restoration of  the rug.  The major attempts to fine his  tenant  “twenty
bushels of corn” (16) against his crop for the botched cleaning. Gender reversal speaks for
Abner’s effect on this occasion: Major de Spain makes his demand in the “trembling”
“shaking”  of  a  “woman”  (15).  Abner  not  deigning  to  reply  through  face-to-face
communication,  but unwilling to produce a greater surplus for his  landlord than his
original contract stipulates, sues the major for overstepping his lawful bounds. Abner
may be a nonwarrantor, with all the disadvantages of that class, yet successive landlords
fail to crush his self-possession. With a wagon his only material object of exchange-value,
the  practically  impecunious  Abner  rates  his  ontological  right  to  master  himself  as
invaluable. His self-assessment mirrors that of his supposed superiors, as the inverted
play of frames in “Barn Burning” avers. For, after his initial visit to Major de Spain’s
house, Abner rematerializes against the background of the cabin where his family are
meant to live. Sarty’s “father appeared at the door” of the shack, “framed against that
shabbiness, as he had been against that other bland perfection, impervious to either”
(13). Although a fleetingly insubstantial shadow of the major, whom Sarty will later see as
“the white man…emerging from a white door down the hall” (23) of his mansion, Abner is
a substantial presence to his youngest son.
41 Both of  no depth and without  depth,  the only  substantial  threat  to  Abner,  the only
manner  of  his  substantiation  as  a  barnburner,  lies  with  Sarty.  Abner,  who  will  not
communicate with his masters through his own voice, might be betrayed by the voice of
his  youngest  son.  “You were  fixing  to  tell  them,”  he  accuses  Sarty  after  the  Harris
hearing.  “You  would  have  told  him”  (8).  Torn  between  his  feeling  that  Abner’s
complainants “wanted only truth, justice” (8), and “the old grief of blood” (3), Sarty’s
silence before the justice at once safeguards Abner’s conditional secret—leaving Abner
free to haunt prospective masters as a potential arsonist—and defends the boy against an
act of perjury. The secret conjectured about the Snopes patriarch remains hidden and,
despite  physical  chastisement  for  what  Abner  deemed to  be  wavering  loyalty,  Sarty
affords himself the hope that “forever” his father is “done satisfied now” (6).
42 Abner, though, experiences no such relief; in fact, Sarty is a growing concern—both a boy
who will be a financial asset to his father and a youth who will cause his father anxiety.
Filial  disloyalty  is  an  aspect  to  the  Oedipal  dilemma  that  Abner  has  negotiated
successfully with his eldest son, whose reticence reassures his father, but which remains
an unresolved issue with his youngest boy. The poststructuralist interpretation of the
Oedipus complex particularly heeds the role of language in this situation. “Pay systematic
attention,” counsels Derrida in Dissemination (1972),  “to the permanence of a Platonic
schema that assigns the origin and power of speech, precisely of logos, to the paternal
position. Not that this happens especially and exclusively in Plato. Everyone knows this
or can easily imagine it,” he contends. “But the fact that ‘Platonism,’ which sets up the
whole of Western metaphysics in its conceptuality, should not escape the generality of
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this structural constraint, and even illustrates it with incomparable subtlety and force,”
he asserts, “stands out as all the more significant” (76). Thus, in an anachronism, “the
‘speaking subject’ is the father of his speech. And one would quickly realize that this is no
metaphor, at least not in the sense of any common, conventional effect of rhetoric. Logos
is a son, then,” reasons Derrida, “a son that would be destroyed by his very presence
without the present attendance of  his father.  His father who answers.  His father who
speaks for him” (77).
43 Abner’s silence toward his warrantors, which says everything about the power of dirt
farmers disenfranchised from the land on which they live and work, speaks for Sarty at
the two justice hearings. On each occasion, Sarty fails in his struggle to overcome his
father’s presence and so fails to father his own logos. Rent bidirectionally when called to
testify, the boy’s stream of consciousness, unmediated by Faulkner’s absolutely secret
narrator, and in silent agreement with but in simultaneous repudiation of his father, also
pulls in two directions. With ellipses doubly enhancing the sense of interiority, Sarty’s
secret thoughts at the Harris hearing exemplify this repeated conundrum: “(our enemy he
thought in that despair; ourn! mine and hisn both! He’s my father!)” (3) is a statement that
can point to Abner as much as to Harris.  This strange doubleness toward the father
characterizes the inheritance of an ironically paternal trait that appears to arise from the
secret  machinations  of  biological  inheritance:  for,  alongside  Abner’s  two  sons  stand
sisters who are “twins” (23).
44 Certainly,  as  Noel  Polk  argues,  Sarty’s  conundrum “crystallizes  and encapsulates  the
dilemma of nearly all children in Faulkner,” descendents who “get caught in the crossfire
between contending but mutually reifying structures that demand their obedience” (28).
Polk identifies these cultural manifestations as the courthouse and the mansion. With
particular reference to “Barn Burning,” these “political and economic bastions of the
symbolic order,” believes Polk, “are much more likely to conspire to maintain his father
in his familial place of localized dominance over Sarty than to free him from them” (27);
as a corollary, “for Sarty and his family, Ab is the law” (28), and Abner’s progeny inhabit
what Polk calls Faulkner’s “dark house”—property within the property of their parents,
such children “have no commerce with the courthouse except as it stands beyond and
validates the power of the father” (29).
45 Notwithstanding the coherence of Polk’s thesis, his sense of “contending” does not fully
acknowledge the ambiguous lure of affranchisement, the Derridean understanding from
On the Name of breaking free of prohibitions, that threatens to tear Sarty apart rather
than meld him into a congruous whole. Having taken Major de Spain to court, and with
the  justice’s  decision  to  lower  the  major’s  compensation,  Sarty  hopes  in  conditional
secrecy for an “economic” cessation of his father’s antagonistic nature. “Maybe it will all
add up and balance and vanish,” he thinks, “—corn, rug, fire; the terror and grief, the being
pulled  two  ways  like  between two  teams  of  horses—gone,  done  with  for  ever  and ever” (17;
emphasis  added).  Sarty  has  lived  his  short  life  in  perpetual  motion  with  his  family
constantly  moving  toward  their  next,  unnamed,  and  therefore  never  fully  localized
location;  he is  a communal stranger;  he is  an impersonal  working component in the
economic  cycle  of  exchange.  The  ruling  somewhat  in  Abner’s favor  might  end  this
itinerancy,  muses  Sarty.  He  even  allows  himself  the  joy  of  a  finite  future  infinitely
construed—that unending satisfaction he had wished on his father after the Harris trial—
but events soon abort his youthful thoughts of settlement (in all its forms).
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46 Unsatisfied by the judgment  against  Major  de Spain,  unreconstructed in his  attitude
toward warrantors, Abner risks no gratuitous communication before taking his revenge.
He even threatens to tie Sarty up, as a safeguard against the revelation of his conditional
secret concerning the razing of the major’s barn, if his wife will not keep the boy within
their cabin. She does as ordered, but with his hopes for a settled life disrupted, Sarty
escapes his mother,  takes on the role of messenger of “truth, justice” (8),  and freely
delivers (or gifts) a warning to the major. In responding to this message, Major de Spain
becomes  as  depthless  as  the  figure  Abner  Snopes  projects,  the  landlord’s  “furious
silhouette” standing out against “the tranquil early summer night sky” (24). That the
outcome  to  Sarty’s  message  is  another  absolute  secret  that  glimmers  almost
indistinguishably on the surface of  Faulkner’s  text therefore comes as little  surprise.
Three gunshots ring out. The boy’s cry of “Pap! Pap!” (14), followed by his past tense
assertion that his father “was brave” (14), possibly point to the major’s deadly uncovering
of Abner’s conditional secret. Maybe the major kills Abner and/or Abner’s eldest son, but
the literary critic, no matter how scrupulous in his analysis, will never know for sure.
Hence,  whichever  reading  suits  the  scholar,  the  profound  reserve  of  deconstructive
energy in “Barn Burning” impassions Faulkner’s text until its narratological end.
47 The stiffness of Abner, the man with “the cold, dead voice” (21), a dead man limping (—
and is that a lie maintained throughout, a conditional secret not even suspected by the
narrator who relates how “a Confederate provost’s man’s musket ball had taken” Abner
“in the heel on a stolen horse thirty years ago” [5]?—) is doubled by the “little stiff” that
the “cold” but “walking” (25) Sarty now manifests.4 The reader can speculate whether
Sarty  Snopes,  as  a  direct  descendant  of  Abner  is  racially  white,  black  passing
(intentionally or not) for white, white artificially black, or black passing (intentionally or
not) for white artificially passing for black, or whether Sarty’s conscience betrays his
mother’s infidelity, but beyond such considerations “Barn Burning” closes with a young,
and therefore still maturing, character headed toward an ever widening horizon.
48 Sarty Snopes does not figure messianicism as Joe Christmas does in Faulkner’s earlier
Light  in  August (1932),  but  evokes the messianic with his  steps toward a never to be
realized  messianicity.  Thanks  to  its  inviolable  secrecy,  argues  Derrida,  literature
immanently  conjures  the imminently  democratic;  this  prospect  of  the ever-presently
democratic from present democracy is the messianic proper. This form of messianism is,
as Derrida’s essay on “Faith and Knowledge” elucidates, “without horizon of expectation
and without prophetic prefiguration” (17).  The messianism of theology,  what Derrida
calls “messianicism,” looks forward to a messiah’s coming as a foreseeable event, but the
atheologically  messianic  emerges  only  when  “no  anticipation  sees  it  coming”  (17).
“Breaking  with  the  present,”  explains  Segal,  “the  secret  (and  with  it  the  gift  and
literature)  testifies  to  such  a  radical  future,  as  do  the  groundless  and  ad  infinitum
hypotheses to which the secret gives rise about the literary text, hypotheses never to be
verified or falsified in any present” (193). Segal turns to John Caputo to corroborate this
interpretation of Derridean thinking. “The ‘messianic secret’ is, there is no secret and the
Messiah is  never  going to  show up,”  confirms Caputo:  “Derrida’s  secret  is  not  some
hyperousiological high he has had and that he now whispers in our ear. Far from it. To be
‘in on the secret’ does not mean you know anything, that you are ‘in the know’—but
rather in the ‘no,’ non-savoir” (102).
49 The profound emanations  of  literature,  which paradoxically  lie  on the surface  of  its
texture, are depthless arrivals that gesture toward an unrealizable future. Baudelaire’s
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“La  fausse  monnaie,”  which  overtly  considers  secrecy  and  voluntary  donation,  is
therefore noticeably immanent, with the messianic, the ever-presently democratic, as a
necessity  of  its  own  critical  analysis.  Sarty  Snopes’s  untold  journey,  which  projects
beyond and therefore breaks through the frame of “Barn Burning,” undoubtedly sounds a
political note too. Fire speaks to Abner, according to the narrator, “as the one weapon for
the preservation of integrity, else breath were not worth the breathing” (7–8). Abner may
be an arsonist, but that insinuation does not damn him in everybody’s judgment. “The
burning of a barn by an impoverished cropper,” as Godden maintains in William Faulkner
(2007), “directs a quasi-political resentment against an institutional structure associated
with a seemingly unchangeable form of labor exploitation.” The poorest among Abner’s
coevals  may  regard  his  supposed  actions  as  “a  utopian  hope,”  while  his  wealthier
counterparts may “tacitly hypothesize a disguised crime” (15),  but the result of  such
speculation  is  both  an  over-  and  undervaluation  of  the  revolutionary  potential
unwittingly invested in some nonwarrantors by their warrantors. The hopes of the next
generation of nonwarrantors, suggests “Barn Burning,” are tied to the power of absolute
secrecy to displace the authority of conditional secrets.
50 Thus, Faulkner’s short story ends with the non-messianicism of a spectral man-child—
whose delineation both invites and defies the demarcations of race and social  status,
allying him with the African-American cause by distancing himself from superordinate
warranteeism—not coming toward but walking away from the reader under the “slow
constellations” (25) an overarching sky. The economy of secrecy rather than race enables
Faulkner to “map imbricated relations” between multifarious forms of otherness. The
secrets of Colonel Sartoris Snopes, the inviolable and revealable secrets that authorize
and censure a democracy to come, thereby propel this figure beyond the frame of this
particular tale and toward an infinitely unrealizable hope, a future without horizon, as
his non-reappearance in the Faulknerian canon silently implies.
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NOTES
1. Segal—whose reading of Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent (1907) help to
inspire  the  present  essay,  and  also  following  Derrida’s  lead—comes  to  a
similar conclusion with respect to Conrad’s novel. “The title of the text—The
Secret Agent—referring to something that breaks with law,” reasons Segal, “is
like  the  title  of  ‘Counterfeit  Money’  as  Derrida  analyzes  it,  a  title  without
title” (196).
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2.  Translations from “La fausse monnaie” are my own.
3.  Mississippian  sociologist  Henry  Hughes  (1829–1862)  uses  the  terms
“warranteeism,”  “warrantor,”  “nonwarrantor,”  and  “warrantee”  in  his
Treatise  on  Sociology  (1854).  Although  Hughes,  as  his  biographer  Douglas
Ambrose  explains,  “did  not  represent  a  dominant  tendency  in  antebellum
southern  thought”  (7),  his  conclusions  in  this  regard  found  pertinence
following  the  war.  White  Americans  should  be  superordinate  warrantors,
African Americans should be subordinate warrantees, thought Hughes, and
the  small  percentage  of  white  Americans  with  no  property  would  be
nonwarrantors.
4.  If Abner has been simulating a limp, then he could play the role of African-
American messenger as Duvall supposes.
ABSTRACTS
Working  from  Jacques  Derrida’s  contentions  about  secrecy  and  authorial  responsibility,  and
paying  brief  but  specific  attention  to  Charles  Baudelaire’s  “La  fausse  monnaie”  (1869),  as
suggested by Derridean concerns over capitalist economics, this article studies the manner in
which the inviolable and conditional secrets of William Faulkner’s “Barn Burning” (1938) reveal
the poststructural tendencies avant la lettre of this leading American modernist.  While Faulkner
scholars have focused on the ambivalent language and metaphors deployed in this short story,
they  have  not  formerly  traced  the  manner  in  which  “Barn  Burning”  incites  a  sense  of
deconstructive criticism, and have thereby failed to acknowledge Faulkner’s attendant authorial
irresponsibility.  This article redresses this critical imbalance.
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Keywords: deconstruction, inviolable (absolute) secrecy, Poststructuralism, revealable
(conditional) secrecy
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